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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HUGH LEONARD W 0 0 D, alias 
JOSEPH EARL MARTIN, alias 
JOSEPH PAUL MARTIN, alias 
JAMES WALTON, 
Defendant and.Appellant. 
Case No. 
8020 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent adopts the Statement of Facts of Appel-
lant. The issues raised on appeal go not to the facts but 
to the law. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
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ALLEGEDLY STOLEN IS NOT REQUIRED 
UNDER SHORT STATUTORY FORM PROVID-
ED BY SECTION 77-21-47, U. C. A. 1953. THE 
ORDER REQUIRING APPELLANT TO AN-
SWER IN THE DISTRICT COURT WAS DULY 
MADE AND SIGNED BY THE COMMITTING 
MAGISTRATE. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
I 
TO GRANT APPELLANT A MISTRIAL. 
POINT III 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR 
DISMISSAL AND FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
SINCE POSSESSION OF PROPERTY RE-
CENTLY STOLEN SHALL BE DEEMED 
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF GUILT. THE 
MATTER OF EXPLANATION OF SUCH 
POSSESSION WOULD ORDINARILY BE A 
QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY. 
j 
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POINT IV 
THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL ACT OF UTAH 
IS CONSTITUTIONAL; IT DOES NOT OF-
FEND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, NOR THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA. 
POINT V 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
SENTENCING ;-AFTER JURY FOUND AP-
PELLANT GUILTY OF GRAND LARCENY 
AND THEREAFTER FOUND HIM GUILTY OF 
HAVING BEEN TWICE BEFORE CONVICTED 
OF FELONY, THE IMPOSITION OF SENT-
ENCE AS PROVIDED FOR BY HABITUAL 
CRIMINAL STATUTE WAS PROPER. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS GIVEN THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INFORMATION SUFFICIENTLY CHARG-
ED THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE; AL- , 
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LEGATION OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY 
ALLEGEDLY STOLEN IS NOT REQUIRED 
UNDER SHORT STATUTORY FORM PROVID-
ED BY SECTION 77-21-47, U. C. A. 1953. THE 
ORDER REQUIRING APPELLANT TO AN-
SWER IN THE DISTRICT COURT WAS DULY 
MADE AND SIGNED BY THE COMMITTING 
MAGISTRATE. 
Appellant relies upon the case of State v. Jensen, 83 
Utah 452, 30 P. 2d 203, for his contention that the informa-
tion did not charge an offense by reason of a failure to al-
lege ownership of the property taken. At the time that 
decision was rendered (May 10, 1934), the short statutory 
form of pleading now provided in our Code of Criminal 
Procedure was non-existent. Section 77-21-47, U. C. A. 
1953, now provides : 
"The following forms may be used in the cases 
in which they are applicable: * * * Larceny-
A. B. stole from C. D. * * *" 
Further, as to ownership, as provided by Section 77-
21-16, U. C. A. 1953, an information or indictment need 
contain no .allegation of the ownership of any property, un-
less such allegation is necessary to charge the offense under 
Section 77-21-8, U. C. A. 1953; the later section permits 
reference in the information or indictment to any statute 
creating the offense charged and provides also that in 
determining the validity or sufficiency of such information, 
regard shall be had to such reference. The complaint in the 
instant case refers to the statute creating the offense of 
I 
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.. 1 
grand larceny and we submit that the accused was indeed 
fully informed of the nature and cause of the accusation 
made against him. This court has said, in substance, that 
by conformance with the statute, i.e., 77-21-8, by citation 
of, or reference to, the section creating the offense, the 
court and the defendant will be sufficiently apprised of 
what was intended to be charged so a plea could be entered, 
defense prepared and penalty be known. State v. Spencer, 
101 Utah 274, 117 P. 2d 455; rehearing denied, 101 Utah' 
287, 121 P. 2d 912. At the expense of substantial justice, 
Appellant here seeks to interpose an artificial nicety. 
Appellant also contends that the committing magistrate 
made and signed no order requiring the Defendant to an-
swer in the District Court to the offenses contained in the 
information. This contention is erroneous; an examination 
of the original complaint discloses, on the back thereof, the 
following indorsement: 
"It appearing to me that the offense in the 
within Complaint mentioned has been committed 
and that there is sufficient cause to believe the with-
in named Hugh Leonard Wood guilty thereof, I 
order that he be held to answer to the same and 
that he be admitted to bail in the sum of Five Thous-
and Dollars and is committed to the Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County until he gives such bail or is legally dis-
charged. 
/s/ J. PATTON NEELEY, 
City Judge and Ex-Officio 
Justice of the Peace." 
The accused was duly bound over and held to answer 
in the District Court by a magistrate having jurisdiction to 
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investigate the charge and to make a determination as to 
probable cause to believe an offense had been committed 
and defendant was guilty thereof. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT APPELLANT A MISTRIAL. 
The court did not err in refusing to grant Appellant a 
mistrial as claimed under Appellant's Point II, for the fol-
lowing reasons : 
1. That part of the information containing allegations 
of prior felony convictions under which Appellant was 
charged with being an habitual criminal was not read to the 
jury in trying the principal charge of grand larceny. Nor 
was the jury ever informed at any time during the trial on 
the principal charge that Appellant was also charged with 
being an habitual criminal. 
While it is true that the jury learned, during the course 
of the trial on the prinicipal charge of grand larceny, that 
Appellant had been convicted theretofore of other felonies, 
this knowledge came to the jury during the regular course 
of cross-examination, the propriety of such cross-examina-
tion to be discussed infra at "2", hence 76-1-19, U. C. A. 
1953, stating: The "Jury shall not be told of the previous 
convictions of felony," was not violated thereby. 
That portion of 76-1-19 above quoted is an injunction 
against a formal reading to the jury of that part of the 
information containing the charge of being an habitual 
criminal during the trial of the principal charge. That it is on 
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also an injunction preventing the prosecution from cross-
examining Defendant with regard to his conviction of prior 
felonies as a test of his credibility as a witness, which would 
seem to be a contention of Appellant, is not sanctioned by 
the authorities. 
2. It is basic in our law that the defendant in a crim-
inal action may be questioned with regard to his prior con-
victions of felony, as affecting his credibility as a witness, 
and if he falsifies with respect to such conviction, he may be 
impeached as any other witness. 78-24-9, U. C. A. 1953: 
Duty to Answer Questions-
"* * * But a witness must answer as to the 
fact of his previous conviction of felony." 
In interpreting the above code citation, the Supreme 
Court, in State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 P. 909, said: 
"A witness as affecting his credibility, may be 
asked if he had not previously been convicted of a 
felony, and the kind or name of the felony, but not 
as to details or circumstances of it; and if the Wit-
ness denies the conviction, according to the weight 
of authority, he may be contradicted by the record 
of a Court of competent jurisdiction showing the 
conviction." 
See also 
State v. Hougensen, 64 P. 2d 229; 
State v. Murphy, 68 P. 2d 188; 
State v. Velsier, 159 P. 2d 371; 
State v. Crawford, 201 P. 2d 1030. 
Since the Appellant upon cross-examination admitted 
one prior conviction (Tr. 106), but denied specifically two 
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other convictions (Tr. 109), it is pertinent to point out that 
the State's attorney is not limited to questioning Defendant 
on only one prior conviction, as contended by Appellant at 
the trial and by implication in his brief on appeal. 
The function of the inquiry into prior convictions is not 
fulfilled if inquir;v is confined to one prior conviction. If 
prior convictions affect the credibility of a witness, it fol-
lows that both the number and the recency of said convic-
tions is material to a jury's determination of the witness's 
present truthtelling. 
The statute quoted in the beginning of this paragraph 
says he must answer to the fact of his "previous conviction 
of felony." The absence of the article "a" in the phrase 
underlined indicates a plural rather than a singular situa-
tion; moreover there is nothing in the statute or the gov-
erning cases on the subject specifically limiting the inquiry 
to one prior conviction. Rather, cases from other jurisdic-
tions indicate the opposite to be true. In State v. Little, · 
154 P. 2d 772, an Oklahoma case. decided in 1945, the court 
held: 
"When a defendant takes the witness stand, the 
prosecution has the right to cross-examine him with 
the same latitude as any other witness. * * * 
he may be interrogated concerning other convictions 
for crime." (Emphasis added.) 
And in People v. Richardson, California Court of Ap-
peals, First District, decided in 1946, 169 P. 2d 44, the 
court said, at page 52 : 
"In this state the testimony of a witness may be 
impeached by proof that he has suffered the prior 
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conviction of a felony. * * * This rule applies 
to a defendant who testifies in his own behalf in a 
criminal trial notwithstanding the fact that such 
evidence tends to prejudice him in the eyes of the 
jury. * * * The nature of the crime or crimes 
of which he was convicted is a proper subject of 
inquiry in establishing the fact of his conviction." 
Finally, upon a denial by the defendant of convictions, 
the prosecution has the right to introduce the record of the 
court of the jurisdiction under which the former conviction 
was had, to contradict the witness, as indicated in the John-
son case cited supra. In the case at bar, when the Defend-
ant denied the two prior convictions, the State's attorney 
put on evidence of the said convictions and it is this conduct 
to which Appellant now excepts. 
We think the argument presented herein answering 
Appellant's Point II is also determinative of Appellant's 
Point V and those parts of Point VI dealing with the alleged 
violation of Appellant's rights as relating to fair trial 
guaranteed by the Constitution and to alleged misconduct 
of prosecution on the matter of habitual criminal charge. 
POINT III 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR 
DISMISSAL AND FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
SINCE POSSESSION OF PROPERTY RE-
CENTLY STOLEN SHALL BE DEEMED 
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF GUILT. THE 
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MATTER OF EXPLANATION OF SUCH 
POSSESSION WOULD ORDINARILY BE A 
QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY. 
In a recent decision of this Court, State of Utah v. 
Benito E. Vigil, . . Utah . . , ... P. 2d ... , the Court said: 
"* * * looking at the evidence * * * 
we find that one of the bags stolen * * * was 
found in defendant's hotel room. Two different 
police officers testified that the defendant stated to 
them that the bag was his * * * . Section 76-
38-1, provided that: 
"'* * * Possession of property recent-
ly stolen, when the person in possession fails · i 
to make satisfactory explanation, shall be deem-
ed prima facie evidence ·of guilt.' 
"Here the suitcase was not only found in de-
fendant's possession but he asserted ownership 
thereto. The jury could reasonably find from this 
evidence that he was in possession of this property, 
that it was recently stolen and that he made no satis-
factory explanation of such possession. Under this 
statute this constitutes prima facie evidence of guilt. 
* * *" (Emphasis added.) 
In the case at bar, the stolen property, at least a part 
of it, was found in Appellant's possession. Police Officer 
Butcher testified that Appellant stated it belonged to him 
(Tr. 58). Wilson, the cab driver, so testified (Tr. 77). 
Detective Reeder testified that Appellant said it belonged 
to him (Tr. 83). Appellant, admittedly, testified otherwise, 
but, the jury did not find his explanation satisfactory. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~· 
~· 
,• 
::.-; 
11 
POINT IV 
THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL ACT OF UTAH 
IS CONSTITUTIONAL; IT DOES NOT OF-
FEND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, NOR THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA. 
No useful purpose would be served by a lengthy dis-
cussion or citation of numerous authorities to be found hold-
ing contrary to the views expressed in the argument of 
Appellant. The statute, 76-1-18, U. C. A. 1953, has on sev-
eral occasions stood the test of constitutionality in this 
Court. Section 76-1-18, reads, in part, as Appellant con-
tends, as follows : 
"Whoever has been previously twice convicted 
of felonies, sentenced and committed to any prison, 
* * *." (Emphasis added.) 
Section 76-1-19 reads, ·in part: 
"In charging a person with being a habitual 
criminal the complaint * * * shall allege the 
felony committed within the state of Utah and shall 
allege the two or more convictions of felony relied 
upon by the state of Utah; * * * " (Emphasis 
added.) 
1:. In view of the wording of these statutes and particu-
larly with regard the phrases "sentenced and committed 
to any prison" and "the two or more convictions of felony 
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relied upon by the State of Utah," Respondent is not in-
clined to accept Appellant's contention that the legislative 
intent was to restrict the application of this law to those 
cases wherein the accused had ·been twice before convicted 
of felony in this State. 
"Felony" is defined by statute, Section 76-1-13, U. C. 
A. 1953, reads: 
"A felony is a crime which is or may be pun-
ishable by death, or by imprisonment in the state 
prison. * * *" 
Appellant's argument to the effect that the word "fel-
ony" has no legal meaning is, admittedly, a novel one. 
Possibly it has merit as to the definition of the word itself 
and it may be conceded here that each and every state may 
by statute define its local legal meaning. However, the 
test is not the "act" that constitutes the "felony" but is 
rather the punishment to be inflicted for the "crime" calling 
for incarceration in a state prison. To put it another way; 
in a prosecution under the Habitual Criminal Act, proof of 
conviction of two or more offenses which are under the 
law of the jurisdiction where committed, punishable by im-
prisonment in a state prison, combined with conviction for 
a felony committed in this State, satisfies the requirement 
of the statute. 
POINT V 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN 
SENTENCING;-AFTER JURY FOUND AP-
PELLANT GUILTY OF GRAND LARCENY 
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AND THEREAFTER FOUND HIM GUIL'rY OF 
HAVING BEEN TWICE BEFORE CONVICTED 
OF FELONY, THE IMPOSITION OF SENT-
ENCE AS PROVIDED FOR BY HABITUAL 
CRIMINAL STATUTE WAS PROPER. 
In Point VIII of his brief, Appellant complains of being 
sentenced to a term of fifteen years as an habitual criminal 
and contends that he should have first been sentenced for 
the crime of grand larceny, i.e., a sentence of one to ten 
years, before the court could impose the greater penalty of 
not less than fifteen years as provided by the habitual crim-
inal statute. For this contention, Appell~nt cites no author-
ity and. Respondent thinks his argument falacious. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho said, on this 
particular question : 
"The third conviction of a person of a felony 
does not constitute a crime. The section merely pro-
vides for punishment, on the third conviction of the 
accused, in excess of that which might have been in-
flicted on him had he not been twice previously con-
victed." 
In Re Bates, Idaho, 1943, 125 P. 2d 1017. 
s See also cases there cited. Again in 1942, the Idaho 
Court said: 
"The purpose of the statute is to increase the 
penalty for the third conviction of a felony, * * * ." 
State v. Prince, 64 Idaho 343, 132 P. 2d 146. 
It appears from research that this is a matter of first 
impression iD: this jurisdiction; however, Respondent sub-
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mits that the very purpose of the statute is to provide for 
the imposition of the greater penalty based upon conviction 
of habitual criminality. The imposition of the greater sent-
ence in lieu of the lesser was proper. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS GIVEN THE JURY. 
Appellant complains of instructions, numbered two and 
seven, as being prejudicial to his rights to a fair trial; and 
especially objects to a portion of Instruction Number Two. 
Said instruction was given as follows: 
"If you find from the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt that someone committed the lar-
ceny as charged in the information, and that there-
after the defendant was found in possession of the 
recently stolen goods and if you also find that the 
defendant failed to give a satisfactory explanation 
of his possession, there would arise an inference that 
the defendant committed the larceny himself, and 
this inference may be considered along with all of 
the other facts and circumstances of the case in de-
termining whether or not you are convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of the -defendant's guilt." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The part given emphasis is that to which Appellant 
objects. Respondent directs the Court's attention to the 
case of State v. Hall, 105 Utah 106, 139 P. 2d 228, wherein 
this Court speaking through Mr. Justice Wolfe said: 
"* * * since the term 'prima facie' is used 
in the statute in the sense of presumptive evidence 
~u 
nrr 
1 ..
mil 
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(State v. Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119 P. 1023) it would 
have been more proper to instruct the jury in sub-
stance that if it found from the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that someone had committed the 
larceny as charged, that the defendant was found in 
possession of the recently stolen goods and that it 
further found that he failed to give a satisfactory 
explanation, there would arise an inference that the 
defendant committed the larceny and that this in-
ference might, with all other circumstances, be con-
sidered in determining whether or not the jury was 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defend-
ant's guilt." 
We submit that Instruction Number Two as given in 
the instant case is, in substance, compatible with that sug-
gested as proper by this Court. However, if it be granted 
but not admitted, that this instruction complained of was 
not proper, then Respondent relies also on the case of State 
v. Hall, supra, for the proposition that the giving of the in-
struction was not prejudicial error, since the jury was 
further instructed that the State still had the burden of 
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Appellant generally states that Instruction Number 
Seven was also prejudicial but says not why; not knowing 
what Appellant holds for this objection, Respondent is re-
luctant to speculate thereupon. We submit, without argu-
ment, that the instruction was proper. 
Generally, as to both of the instructions objected to, 
, the record shows merely that: 
"The defendant in this action excepts to in-
struction number two, and the defendant objects to 
instruction number seven for the record" (Tr. 141). 
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We suggest that the portions of the instructions ob-
jected to were not sufficiently pointed out and that, unless 
the whole of the instruction was bad, such an exception 
would be unavailing for the purpose of having any particu-
lar part reviewed and passed upon on appeal. Ryan v. 
Beaver County, 82 Utah 27, 21 P. 2d 858, 89 A. L. R. 1253. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General 
ALDON J. ANDERSON, 
District Attorney 
">D. CHRISTIAN RONNOW, 
Deputy District Attorney 
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